Euthyphro

As you explore the relationship between religion and morality, you will find that some people believe things are good because god commands them and some things are bad because God forbids them. This is called divine command theory. For example, if you argue homosexuality, slavery, and genocide are wrong because God forbids them then you are using divine command theory.

But intelligent theists and atheists are aware that there is a deep problem with basing your morality on what God commands. It’s not simply that people disagree about God’s existence or what God commands, there is a deeper problem. That is, even if everyone agreed that God exists and agreed on what God commands, this problem would remain.

This problem is called the euthyphro dilemma. A dilemma is when there are two choices and neither of the two choices is good.

So, what is the Euthyphro Dilemma? Well, Plato wrote a dialogue called the Euthyphro, which you will be reading and answering questions about it at the end of this lesson. In the dialogue, Socrates is talking to a religious man named Euthyphro. At one point, and this is the most important point in the dialogue, Socrates asked Euthyphro whether the gods love pious acts because they are pious or if it is pious because it is loved by the gods. The question can be phrased for the modern monotheist in the following way:

Does God will it because it is good or is it good because God wills it?

This is a deep question and I recommend you think carefully about it before giving an answer. Euthyphro could not adequately answer this question, and many theists have struggled with it ever since.  Let’s look at the 2 options ofthe dilemma.  As we proceed, I have three lovely pictures I drew to help you understand this dilemma.

Let’s start with the second option. The second option (i.e. it is good because God wills it) has a few problems. Now, one obvious problem is knowing God’s Will. People disagree about what God wills, which is one reason why there are so many religions. But this is a superficial problem, there is a deeper problem that exists even when everyone assumes God’s existence and agree on what God wills and commands.

Before getting into these deeper problems, notice the second option is divine command theory. Divine Command Theory is the position that God determines morality. That is, morally good acts are those that God commands, and morally bad acts are those God forbids. For example, a divine command theorist may argue that homosexuality is wrong simply because God forbids it. It doesn’t matter if homosexuality is natural or unnatural or whether it promotes happiness... all that matters to the divine command theorist (in the end) is that God forbids it or allows it.  With that in mind, let’s examine the major problem with arguing morality is nothing but what God commands, the problems with divine command theory, the second horn of the dilemma.

The first problem with basing morality solely on God’s commands is that it seems to make morality arbitrary since God could command anything to be good and it would suddenly be good. For example, let’s say divine command theory is correct and it is wrong to drown kids for fun because God forbids it. Now, if the morally good act is simply what God commands, then God could change his mind and command that I drown my kids in a bathtub and that act would suddenly become good. It doesn’t matter if I think killing children is usually wrong because it violates rights, does not promote happiness, and simply goes against the empathy that I have for kids. All of these reasons and moral emotions  are irrelevant if I am a divine command theorist. So the first and major problem with the second option (i.e. it’s good because God commands it) is it makes morality arbitrary. It makes morality like an arbitrary matter of taste, it’s good simply because God likes it and God could like anything at anytime.  But, I just don’t see how God commanding the drowning of kids for fun would suddenly make it good. I don’t see how things are good because God commands or wills them.

Now, a divine command theorist may object and say, “God would never command you to torture, kill, or rape children for fun.” But this response misses the point. If divine command theory is correct, then morality is simply based on what God commands so how can anyone possibly know God would not command these heinous acts? To know that, the person would have to appeal to some other than God’s commands.

Indeed, there was recently a lady in Houston who believed God told her to drown her kids in the bathtub. Also, God told Abraham to sacrifice his son. Some of the crusaders and many terrorists believe God commands them to do many heinous acts. How do you know God won’t ask you to kill your child tomorrow as he did Abraham? The bottom line is divine command theory (i.e. the second option of the dilemma) makes morality arbitrary. Heinous acts like drowning children for fun would suddenly become obligatory if God commanded them.

At this point, it should also become clear that many people are not really divine command theorists. This is because they present arguments like “God wouldn’t do that because it is wrong to kill an innocent life.” That is, their morality is really based on the idea that it is wrong to kill an innocent life, not so much on what somebody claims to be God’s will.

Now, there are other problems with the second option (e.g. it makes morality mysterious and gives the wrong reasons for being moral), and I will address them in the question section. For now, I will say that not everyone understands the problem with the second option that Socrates outlined so long ago, but Euthyphro, atheists, and many intelligent theists do understand. They understand that the second option implies that killing children for fun could be made moral. They understand that the main problem with the second option is that it makes morality arbitrary, and so they propose another option. They propose that an act is good not because God commands it, rather God commands it because it is good. This avoids the arbitrary problem because it avoids the implication that killing children for fun could become morally good.

However, the first option (i.e. God commands it because it is good) has one serious problem. It sets up a standard of goodness separate from God. That is, it makes God a middle man. This is a problem because most monotheists believe God is the omnipotent source of all goodness. If God merely recognizes good and then informs humans, it follows that God is not omnipotent. God is not the source of all goodness, but merely informs us about some independent standard of good like a middleman or good parent. You can see this illustrated under number one.

Let’s use an example. Imagine you have good parents and they train you to go to bed at a reasonable time, eat healthy, follow the golden rule, be empathetic towards others, and live a good moral life. At some point, your reason develops and you understand these things are not good because your parents commanded them, rather your parents taught you these things because they are good… perhaps because they help you flourish in life. That is, you realize your parents and culture are not the source of goodness, rather they are goodness recognizers and transmitters.  They teach you what they think will lead to a good life, just as a mother acorn may teach baby acorns to sunbathe and get enough water.  Indeed, If you think something is good merely because your parents or culture say so, then you still have an immature or undeveloped mindset. Your parents and culture are good recognizers, not good creators.

So, if the first option is correct, then God is like a good parent. God is a good recognizer, not a good creator. If the first option is correct, there is a god- independent standard of goodness. See diagram.

“John Arthur (2005) puts the point this way: “If God approves kindness because it is a virtue and hates the Nazis because they were evil, then it seems that God discovers morality rather than inventing it” (20, emphasis added). God is no longer sovereign over the entire universe, but rather is subject to a moral law external to himself” (Michael Austin, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Again, this turns God into something like a good parent or middleman who discovers principles that lead to human flourishing and then transmits them to people. To use philosophical jargon, God and your parents may originally be the epistemological source of your morality (i.e. how you come to know good from bad), but they are not the metaphysical source (i.e. the deeper reason that makes it good or bad).

So, we now have the two horns of the euthyphro dilemma. Morality is either arbitrary meaning anything could be good, or God is not the source of morality and “is subject to an external moral law” (Austin, IEP).  So, is there a solution?

Well, some people have presented a third option to the Euthyphro Dilemma. This is the idea that God is goodness. God does not arbitrarily will what is good; rather goodness flows from God’s Essence. You can see this option in the diagram under number three.

To clarify number 3, notice we may use reason to discover God’s essence, which is truth and goodness. For example, let’s say Einstein’s Laws are true. When we rationally discover such laws, we are discovering the essence or mind of God. Likewise, when we discover that slavery is bad, we are discovering the moral essence of God. This is not essential to the third option, but it is a nice way to think of it. In short, God does not arbitrarily will goodness as in picture one and two, rather God is goodness, so goodness flows from God’s essence.

However, this third option may fall into the same dilemma. To see why, consider this question, “Does God choose God’s essence?” Some people say God is omnipotent and so can choose his essence. If this is correct, then God could choose a different essence. But this presents the same dilemma.  Did  something else make God’s essence or did God choose his essence? If God chose his essence, then he chose that to be good.  If that is the case, he could have chosen a different essence (e.g. an essence that enjoys drowning kids). If God did not choose his essence, then God is not omnipotent and is subject to something else that made his essence. Again, if God chose his essence then he chose goodness (option 2). The problem with this option is God could have chosen any essence, he could have chosen to like killing kids for fun. If God did not choose his essence (option 1), then something independent of God chose it. In that case, God’s essence and goodness areindependent of God and God becomes a good parent or middleman instead of the source of all goodness.  In short, the third option seems to collapse into one of the first two options.

So, there you have it. This is the Euthyphro Dilemma. Socrates presented the first two options, he did not address the third. It’s just as well since the third collapses back into the first two options.

Now, I agree with some other philosophers that your ability to deeply understand this dilemma is a reflection of whether you are capable of a certain kind of philosophy. Whatever you think, the Euthyphro is the portal into a much deeper exploration of the relationship between morality and religion. In the end, it challenges the idea that morality can be based solely on God’s commands; It is a challenge to Divine Command Theory. To deepen your understanding, please review the following questions and possible answers. Then follow the link to read the actual Euthyphro Dilemma and answer the guided questions. Don’t neglect reading the primary source! There is so much more there than I covered in this video.

Exercise : Answer/Discuss the following questions.

  1. Explain how the second option (i.e. divine command theory)  makes morality arbitrary.

Killing kids for fun becomes automatically good if “it is good (or bad) simply because God wills it.” There is no need to appeal to scientific facts, empathy, greatest happiness, or rights. The mere fact that God thinks and commands it to be good would make it so.

  1. Discuss whether the second option (i.e. divine command theory)  motivates a person to do the right thing for the wrong reasons.

It seems to give the wrong reasons for being moral. For example, imagine a person chooses to not torture kittens because he believes it causes unnecessary suffering.  A second person also refuses to torture kittens but only because he believes God forbids it. Is not the first person more stable and moral?  

  1. Explain why the second option (i.e. divine command theory) makes morality mysterious?

Another problem with divine command theory, with the idea that an act is good because God wills it, is that it makes morality mysterious. We can understand how to make things, but how do you make a thing good? When we argue about moral matters like slavery, most people argue slavery is wrong because it violates rights, does not promote the greatest happiness, or does not follow the Golden Rule. But if divine command theory is correct, none of that really matters. All that matters is that God commands or forbids it. So, morality is no longer a matter of determining how to protect rights or promote happiness, it now becomes a matter of knowing God’s will and it may be completely mysterious as to why God wills some things but not others. Like some forms of relativism, it cuts off reasoning on moral issues.

  1. Explain why the first option (i.e. God wills it because it is good) is unsatisfactory to modern monotheists.

It is unsatisfactory because it presents an independent standard of goodness (to God). It turns God into a good parent or middleman instead of the source of all goodness.

  1. Explain the three pictures representing the three options.

See video.

  1. Explain/Discuss the third option.

It seems the third option (i.e. God is goodness and does not arbitrarily will good and bad) faces the same problems if we assume God is omnipotent and could have chosen a different nature for himself. If God is not omnipotent, then he did not choose his nature and so there is an independent standard making God’s nature and, hence, is the true source of goodness.

Of course, this third option can become quite complex and distinctions like God’s essence and existence need to be made.

  1. Can God be omnipotent if the third option is true?

Yes, but God’s omnipotence does not adequately resolve the Euthyphro Dilemma because the question then becomes “Did God get his essence or did God choose his essence?” That is, “Is God’s essence good because it is good, or is God’s essence good because God commanded/created it?”

  1. Do people discover the mind of God when they discover what is right/wrong?

Some may think so, but this third option does not resolve the Euthyphro dilemma (see 7).

9. Isn’t this based on a misunderstanding of omnipotence?

No, I am aware that omnipotence doesn’t mean God can do the logically impossible like round a square or create a married bachelor. However, the Euthyphro Dilemma does not depend on omnipotence, it simply depends on whether an act is good because it is good or because God wills it.

To illustrate, we can substitute your “culture” for God, “Do you believe it is good because it is good or because your culture wills it?” The same issue arises without any claims to omnipotence.

10. Why is this question here? I don't know.

  1. Is the Euthyprho Dilemma an argument against God’s existence?

No, the Euthyphro Dilemma does not prove or disprove God’s existence, rather it presents a challenge to anyone who bases morality on what they think God commands. However, it is a counter to one of the arguments for God’s existence, the moral argument.  

  1. Why is it wrong to disobey God?

Well, it might be because God knows better than us. If that is the case, God is like a good parent or middleman, not the source of all morality.

Authority. That is an appeal to authority fallacy. You don’t really believe that because you give me reasons for why God would not will the drowning of kids for fun.

Power. But then we would be following the principle “might makes right,” but surely God doesn’t want us to do that. 🙂

Application and Value

Exploring the Euthyphro Dilemma can help you better understand the relationship between your moral and religious beliefs. All of the most intelligent and popular theists and atheists have struggled with it throughout history (e.g. Descartes, Luther, Anselm, Hobbes, etc.), and now it is your turn. You are welcome.

In my experience, people often give simplistic answers at first. for example, they may argue that both horns of the dilemma are true, but a little reflection should help one see why both options cannot be true. Second, some will try to avoid the dilemma by arguing there is a third option, God is goodness. This is more sophisticated and many fine distinctions can be made between essence and existence, epistemology and metaphysics, and so on…. but, in the end, this third option brings up the sam dilemma “Was God’s essence determined or was it chosen.”

In the end, the divine command theorist ultimately resorts to arguments that make morality a mysterious matter instead of one in which we try to maximize the greatest happiness and protect a set of rights we agree on and that are essential for human flourishing.

There may be a God, but believing morality is nothing but Gods commands is problematic. And even intelligent theists agree with me. Intelligent theists believe God gave them reason and empathy to discover right and wrong, to discover the conditions that best promote human flourishing. Indeed, even the divine command theorists aren’t usually divience command theorists because they often give god-independent reasons for why we should obey God or act in moral ways.

Now, let’s read the actual dialogue. As you read, answer the following questions.

Euthyphro Guided Reading

  1.  After the intro in which Socrates describes why he is being brought to trial, Euthyphro describes who he is prosecuting. Who is he prosecuting and why?
  2.  Socrates then praises Euthyphro for understanding divine things. He asks Euthyphro to explain what it means to be pious/good. Euthyphro gives an example of  a pious act, but Socrates asks for a DEFINITION of Pious. Notice this is the Socratic Method in action. What is the form of a pious act? That is, what is Euthyphro’s first definition of pious? (pg 22)
  3.  What is Socrates’ response to this definition? That is, what is his counterargument that shows the definition is not sufficient)? Notice this is the Socratic Method in action.
  4.  Socrates and Euthyphro then discuss whether one can determine that which all the gods agree on. After some time, Socrates then shifts the discussion to a more subtle point. Since Euthyphro believes the pious is that which is loved by the gods and the impious is that which is not loved by the gods, Socrates then asks the following important question: “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”  (p 24)

How would you answer this question?

  1.  Why is the pious not “that which is loved by the gods”? p 25 (This is the central point of the dialogue)
  2. The previous question is never answered by Euthyphro. Euthyphro then suggests that piety is a kind of justice, a kind of ‘looking after’ the gods. But Socrates’ questioning shows that this too is an insufficient definition because it leads back to the question in number 4 above. Euthyphro then walks off frustrated. Socrates’ question is not answered and the reader remains in a state of aporia ( unknowing). Of course, it is important to remember that Socrates is not a sophist… he does believe there are answers and that they can be reached via such rational dialogue. But it seems clear that morality is not simply a matter of appealing to the commands of God.